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Responding to the loud wake-up call sounded in the 2000 election, Con-
gress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, including provi-
sions to streamline and modernize voter registration databases and establish 
identification requirements.  However, in direct contravention of the intent 
of HAVA—to impose fair and more uniform standards for state election 
administration—some states have misinterpreted the law and passed oner-
ous “No Match, No Vote” laws.  
Under such statutes, if a state is unable to match the information on a voter’s 
registration application with information in an existing government database, 
the application is denied outright.  Many of these non-matches, however, can 
be the result of errors outside of the applicant’s control such as  typographical 
data entry errors, flaws in existing governmental databases, and poor database 
matching protocols.  By making it more difficult and sometimes impossible 
for applicants to register to vote, No Match, No Vote laws can and do disen-
franchise qualified citizens.  Shortly before the 2008 election, Time magazine 
declared the “Database Dilemma” number one on their list of “Things That 
Could Go Wrong on Election Day.”1
Fortunately, the majority of  states have not adopted draconian No Match, No 
Vote policies.  In some states, when election officials cannot find a match, they 
contact the applicant to request further proof of identification.  If the attempt 
to contact the applicant is unsuccessful, those states usually allow him or her to 
cure the non-match by showing identification at the polling place, or provide 
for other methods of verifying identity.  Currently, the  major problems lie in 
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Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and South Dakota. These four 
states have enacted strict No Match, No Vote laws, where 
applicants are not added to the rolls of registered voters 
until the states receive identification or other verification 
of the applicant’s driver’s license, identification card, or 
Social Security number.
As this paper will demonstrate, plenty of research exists 
to show that matching voter data with other government 
databases—though required by HAVA—is an unreliable, 
error-laden process, and that conditioning the right to 
vote on such a flawed system will inevitably disenfranchise 
eligible citizens.  HAVA’s verification provisions were put 
into place to improve state database management and 
facilitate accurate record keeping.  These provisions were 
written to ensure that every voter’s registration record 
has a unique number associated with it to allow states to 
easily identify duplicate registration records with greater 
confidence and determine and eliminate voters no longer 
eligible to vote in that jurisdiction.2  As the legislative 
history points out, it was not HAVA’s intent in requiring 
a match to disenfranchise those otherwise eligible ap-
plicants whose data does not match exactly.  Therefore, in 
order to comply with federal law while maintaining the 
rights of its citizens to vote, states should follow the best 
practices discussed below.
Emergence of No Match, 
No Vote Problems 
After the 2000 election, the cracks and flaws in the na-
tion’s electoral systems were more visible than ever.  In 
an effort to update outdated procedures and create 
more consistent processes across the country, Congress 
passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to “establish 
minimum election administration standards.”3  One of 
HAVA’s most significant advances in the administration 
of elections is its requirement that each state create and 
maintain a single, uniform, computerized statewide voter 
registration list.4  This list was designed to replace the lists 
that each county or election jurisdiction had previously 
kept individually, which were often incomplete, disorga-
nized, or contained inconsistent data.5  
To ensure that the data is complete and accurate, and to 
reduce any duplicate entries that might appear, each legal-
ly registered voter’s database entry must contain a unique 
identifier.6  For new applicants, this identifier is the ap-
plicant’s driver’s license number, the number on a state-
issued identification card, or the last four digits of the 
applicant’s Social Security number.7  If an applicant does 
not have a current and valid driver’s license, state issued 
identification, or Social Security number, the state will 
create and assign the applicant a number that will serve to 
identify the applicant for voter registration purposes.8  
HAVA Sec. 303(a)(5)(B) is the most contentious when 
dealing with No Match, No Vote laws.  State election of-
ficials and the state motor vehicle authority are required 
to enter into an agreement to match information in the 
statewide voter registration database with information 
in the database of the motor vehicle authority to the 
“extent required to enable each such official to verify the 
accuracy of the information provided on applications for 
voter registration.”9  The same matching procedures are to 
be done between the voter registration database and the 
Social Security Administration database when the voter 
registration forms contain partial Social Security numbers 
instead of a driver’s license number.  
HAVA does not define the terms “match” and “verify,” 
leaving it up to each state to determine how to use its 
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databases in the registration process.  The Brennan Center 
for Justice argues that, “…the statute does not even require 
that ‘verification’ be used for the purpose of confirming 
a voter’s identity.  Verification could, and indeed should, 
also be used not only for correcting bureaucratic errors 
and improving confidence in the state’s administrative 
recordkeeping, but also for the purpose of supplement-
ing information or correcting errors on voter registration 
applications.”10  These new databases and coordinating 
procedures were set up with the explicit goal of making 
the administration of elections more efficient, but some 
state bureaucrats have used these provisions to impose ad-
ditional barriers on the road to voter registration.  
After HAVA was passed a number of states enacted No 
Match, No Vote laws, which require an exact match to be 
found before the applicant can be registered to vote.  This 
standard usually requires matching of the same name, 
date of birth, and a unique identifying number in the two 
databases being compared.  Since those policies were first 
passed, a number of states (including California, Mary-
land, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washing-
ton) have abandoned them for policies that more faith-
fully comport with the spirit and intention of HAVA.  
Unfortunately, four states (Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and 
South Dakota) still insist on using these matching proce-
dures, which prevent eligible applicants with unsuccessful 
matches from becoming registered to vote.11 
Problems with No Match, 
No Vote Laws
Underlying all of the specific problems with No Match, 
No Vote laws is the general issue of how far those poli-
cies distort HAVA’s purpose and instead create unneces-
sary barriers to registration and voting.  The legislators 
at the forefront of the implementation of HAVA made 
their intentions clear that nothing in HAVA was meant 
to prohibit a state from registering applicants whose 
information cannot be matched.   In fact, Senator Chris 
Dodd (D-CT), one of HAVA’s sponsors, stated explicitly 
that a missing or incomplete number is not an automatic 
disqualification from registration.  He explained, “[I]t is 
simply not an accurate reading of this section to conclude 
that a lack of a match or a “no-match” will result in the 
invalidation of a voter’s registration application. . .
[N]othing in [Section 303(a)(5)(a)] prohibits a State 
from accepting or processing an application with incom-
plete or inaccurate information.”12  Senator Kit Bond 
(R-MO) concurred, explaining that the electronic veri-
fication of an individual’s identity against existing state 
databases was simply a process that states may follow in 
lieu of an individual’s providing proof of identity.13  A 
state may also verify and prove voters’ identities by requir-
ing first-time voters to show ID and matching the voter’s 
signatures.
Another major problem with No Match, No Vote laws 
is the myriad of flaws inherent in the matching process 
itself.  Poor database construction and bad matching 
programs can impair even a process intended to be as pro-
tective of applicants as possible.  The most accurate voter 
registration application, entered into the state’s voter reg-
istration database with the utmost care, will not produce 
a match if that existing database contains errors.  Married 
names may also create problems in non-matches between 
databases, for example a voter may have a driver’s license 
issued in her maiden name but register to vote with her 
married name, causing a non-match.  The same is true for 
double surnames and hyphenated names, which can also 
create problems when they are entered into various data-
bases differently or into the same database inconsistently 
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by different data processors.  Nicknames (Bill v. William) 
and suffixes ( Jr., Sr.) present similar issues.  First and last 
names can often be reversed in the database, a problem 
especially common with ethnic names that are unfamiliar 
to clerks.  Perhaps the most troubling issue arises when 
non-matches are due to typographical or data entry errors, 
clearly beyond the control of the voter.  
The negative impact of No Match, No Vote laws is 
startling, especially since the non-matches are due to no 
fault of the applicant.  The Brennan Center estimates that 
matching voter data fails from 20 to 30 percent of the 
time, and anecdotal evidence supports this proposition.14  
In 2008, Wisconsin became aware of this problem when 
they proposed an exact match rule.  Not only did they 
find that more than 20 percent of new voters did not 
match Department of Transportation records on first 
comparison, but four of six members of their Government 
Accountability Board (G.A.B., which runs state elections) 
failed the initial check.15   Elections Division Adminis-
trator Nat Robinson noted, “This is significant because 
two-thirds of the G.A.B., made up of long-time voters 
and well-respected former judges, could have been forced 
to vote on provisional ballots.  It’s clear the data quality 
issue must be addressed before this cross- checking func-
tion can be used to ensure reliable voter data.”16  Because 
of these startling results, the Division decided to adopt a 
less strict matching procedure.  All new voter registration 
information will be matched against DOT records, and 
when voter information does not match DOT records, 
the municipal clerk will review the original registration 
documents to check for data entry errors.  If the discrep-
ancy is not resolved, the clerk will send a letter to the 
voter to clarify the difference.17 
A high frequency of non-matches is not just a characteris-
tic of state and local databases— ;they are just as common 
in national databases.  As of February 2007, the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) reported that 46.2 percent 
of their 2.6 million attempted matches resulted in a failed 
match, acknowledging that the vast majority of these 
were false negatives (eligible voters who exist in the SSA 
Database, but whose records were not matched).18  A June 
2009 study from the Social Security Administration Of-
fice of the Inspector General found that their no-match 
response rate had improved, but was much higher than 
other verification programs—31 percent versus 6 to 15 
percent—and admitted that their program provides states 
with inaccurate verification responses.19  The SSA recog-
nizes the seriousness of the failures in their system and 
acknowledges that the Social Security Administration’s 
Help America Vote Verification (HAVV) program “pro-
vided the States with responses that may have prevented 
eligible individuals from registering to vote and allowed 
ineligible individuals to vote.  Given that the HAVV 
verification responses are used as part of the process to 
approve or deny an applicant’s right to vote, SSA should 
consider working with the States to develop an acceptable 
level of false negative or false positive verification respons-
es.”20  The report finds that the high rate of errors are due 
to the limitation of only using the last four digits of the 
Social Security number and the lack of flexible matching 
criteria in their program.21  The SSA plans to conduct a 
separate review focusing on states’ use of the HAVV pro-
gram and what actions are taken when the state receives a 
no-match response from SSA.22
 A related problem with the matching process is the varia-
tions in the criteria determined to constitute a “match.”  
Some states’ matching programs use a stricter standard 
and require an exact match of all data fields.  Other states 
recognize that errors are commonplace in databases and 
instead employ a more flexible standard, often compiling a 
list of possible matches, taking into account typographical 
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errors and common nicknames.  
The essential policy issue raised by No Match, No Vote 
laws is the question of what a state does with a voter’s 
registration application if no match is found between 
the information provided and the existing government 
database.  Four states employing the strictest No Match, 
No Vote procedures reject a registration outright if no 
match can be found.23  Other states are more flexible and 
place the applicant on the pollbooks, often as “provi-
sional” or “pending” voters, which may require additional 
identification or an affidavit to complete the registration 
process and vote by regular ballot.24  Those states will 
only allow non-matched applicants to vote by provisional 
ballot, which will then only be counted if the identifica-
tion number or voter’s identity is verified.  While the use 
of provisional ballots is better than the outright rejection 
of non-matched applicants, it is nonetheless problematic.  
In the 2008 general election, only 67.3% of provisional 
ballots were counted in whole or in part; according to 
the Election Assistance Commission, more than 600,000 
provisional ballots were rejected. Acceptance rates vary 
widely among states; in 2008, Maine fully counted 100% 
provisional ballots cast and Alaska fully or partially
counted 98.7% of provisional ballots cast, while Delaware 
counted only 15.7% and Oklahoma only 16.6% of provi-
sional ballots cast.25 
Also troublesome are the differing ways in which states 
notify (or do not notify) applicants of their failure to 
match and their resulting registration status.  This may 
vary based simply on the criteria used to match the voter’s 
application.  For example, when reporting a non-match, 
the Social Security Administration does not tell the 
state which part of the record failed to match, making it 
difficult to determine where the problem lies and who 
must correct the error.26  Notifications also vary between 
jurisdictions and often contain confusing or incomplete 
instructions on what steps the voter must take to com-
plete his registration.  
The final area of variation among the states is the ability 
of an applicant to correct or cure a non-matched applica-
tion.  This is another procedural hurdle, as it shifts the 
responsibility back to the voter even in situations when a 
non-match is caused through no fault of his or her own.  
According to the Brennan Center, as of 2006, twenty-two 
states allow an applicant to resolve errors in the registra-
tion process even if the voter registration deadline has 
passed; ten will accept corrections, but not for the pur-
poses of voting in the upcoming election; and three states 
will leave the decision up to the local jurisdiction.27
The problems created by No Match, No Vote laws are 
especially troublesome for minority voters.  In Florida, 
between 2006 and 2007, African-Americans and Latinos 
made up less than 30 percent of the voter registration 
applicant pool, but their applications were roughly 65 
percent of all those rejected in those years because of non-
matches.28  Even in the months after Florida’s No Match, 
No Vote law was amended (see page 7), nearly 9,000 new 
registrants have not been matched with existing records.  
About 27 percent of the rejected registrants said they 
were Hispanic and 27 percent identified themselves as 
African-American, while less than 20 percent of the re-
jected registrants were White.29  While the No Match, No 
Vote laws may not be intended to disenfranchise minori-
ties, they may have that effect due to naming conventions 
in some ethnic groups (for example, the common hyphen-
ation of Latino surnames).
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Litigation
The recent proliferation of No Match, No Vote laws and 
procedures has spawned several court challenges, with 
markedly different results.  This is an evolving area of vot-
ing rights law and should be watched carefully.
Washington  
In 2006, the Washington Association of Churches30, an 
association engaged in voter registration, brought suit to 
strike down Washington’s newly enacted “matching” law.  
The new law, RCW 29A.08.107, required the secretary 
of state to “match” the applicant’s driver’s license number, 
state identification card number, or last four digits of the 
Social Security number with existing state databases or 
determine that the applicant does not have any of those 
numbers.31  Only once this match or determination could 
be made was the secretary allowed to place the applicant 
on the official list of registered voters.  The Washington 
Association of Churches argued that this matching re-
quirement constituted an absolute precondition to voter 
registration.32  The law contained a safeguard, in which 
an applicant whose information could not be matched 
would be contacted, but the plaintiffs argued that this 
did not solve major problems with the matching proce-
dure—the errors in the existing state databases and the 
protocol used to match the information—both of which 
are beyond the applicant’s control.  
After the law was preliminarily enjoined in 2006, the 
parties settled and entered into a consent agreement in 
March 2007.  Under this agreement, the state was en-
joined from enforcing the statute in a way that would 
deny a voter registration application solely because of 
a failure to match an applicant’s driver’s license num-
ber, state identification card number, or Social Security 
numbers from the voter registration form with exist-
ing government databases.  The consent order set forth 
a five-part analysis for provisional registration that the 
state is to follow based on the state’s ability to match 
information.  First, if there is a match, the applicant shall 
be registered to vote.  If a match cannot be made but the 
applicant presents an election official with an alternative 
form of identification, the applicant shall be registered 
to vote effective as of the “date of submission or receipt 
of the original application.”33  If the applicant does not 
become registered under either of these scenarios, the 
state is required to provisionally register the applicant and 
promptly notify the applicant in writing of this status and 
the need to provide additional documentation or infor-
mation.  The applicants in this third group are included in 
the official rolls of registered voters and permitted to cast 
a ballot in any primary or election, but their cast ballots 
cannot be tabulated until the State receives the additional 
documentation sufficient to register the voter (informa-
tion or documentation that would put the voter into one 
of the first two categories).  Finally, the order allows the 
State to remove a voter from the roll who has stayed in 
provisional status for two general federal elections since 
the date of the original application. 
Florida
Opponents of No Match, No Vote laws met a much 
different fate in Florida in a suit brought by the Florida 
NAACP.34  Florida had enacted a law similar to Washing-
ton’s, stating that an application would not be considered 
“valid,” and the applicant not registered, unless and until 
the state performed a successful database match or other-
wise verified the number provided by the applicant.  The 
law also provided that the State must correspond with the 
applicant about the absence of a match, but the burden 
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then shifts to the applicant to prove the authenticity of 
the number supplied on the application.  If the applicant 
cannot be reached or does not provide the evidence the 
state deems necessary to verify the application, the appli-
cant may only vote by provisional ballot.  
Plaintiffs argued that this law effectively transformed the 
government function of assigning each voter a unique 
identifying number into a barrier to registration and vot-
ing.  Eligible and truthful registration applicants whose 
information does not exactly match information in other 
databases suddenly become presumptively ineligible, 
and will have to struggle—often without knowing the 
problem and often unsuccessfully—to have their votes 
counted.35  The plaintiffs repeated a major concern from 
the Washington Association of Churches case: a U.S. 
Government Accountability Office report, which said 
that the biggest problem state officials are facing is that 
the Social Security Administration is not specifying what 
voter information was not matching, and that without 
this information applicants are not able to efficiently 
resolve the non-matching problems.36  
Though their allegations and the challenged law were 
almost identical to the Washington case discussed above, 
the plaintiffs had a much more difficult time convinc-
ing Florida’s federal courts of the matching law’s legal 
shortcomings.  In December 2007, the District Court 
for the Northern District of Florida granted an injunc-
tion for the plaintiffs, finding that the matching law had 
resulted in “actual harm to real individuals.”  However, in 
April 2008, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the injunction 
without ruling whether the law was unconstitutional, 
but holding that plaintiffs did not make a strong enough 
showing that an injunction was necessary on the ground 
that federal statutes preempted the Florida matching 
law.  In response to the litigation, as well as the public 
and media condemnation of the law and its confusing 
standards, the legislature made changes to the No Match 
law, which the plaintiffs again challenged by filing a 
renewed motion for preliminary injunction, this time on 
constitutional grounds.  They continued to argue that the 
notification and subsequent applicant verification pro-
cess was flawed because some applicants never received 
notices of the non-matches, and the notices that were 
received contained no information about the defect in 
the application or the source of the non-match.  Further, 
plaintiffs maintained that the standards for Election Day 
verification were confusing and difficult for poll workers 
to implement.  The motion was denied primarily because 
the Court believed that plaintiffs did not adequately pres-
ent evidence that the new law imposed the same harms 
as the original statute.  The state argued, and the Court 
agreed, that verification was made easier because appli-
cants could verify their identity by showing a form of ID 
(driver’s license, state-issued ID card, Social Security card) 
to authenticate their number, regardless of what number 
they actually listed on their application.37  This amend-
ment, they argued, no longer limits the ability to verify 
and establish one’s actual number to those who originally 
wrote the number correctly on their application form.  
The state also argued that it had improved the matching 
process and provided further guidelines to increase the 
effectiveness of the notification process.
What the Florida statute fails to provide, unlike the 
Washington statute, is the right of unmatched applicants 
to be provisionally registered, pending further verifica-
tion of their identities.  Washington also provides a more 
robust and complete notification process, an essential part 
of any valid matching process, given all of the common 
flaws in existing state databases. 
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Best Practices
More Flexible Match Criteria and 
Procedures
Because the result of a failed match can be the disenfran-
chisement of an eligible voter, election officials should 
make every effort to err on the side of accepting the ap-
plication. This means using a more flexible standard when 
determining what constitutes a “match.”  Exact matches 
in every field should never be required because of the 
flaws routinely seen in existing government databases.  
States should set their matching programs (and direct the 
Social Security Administration to do the same) to search 
for matches and, when an exact match cannot be found, 
it should compile an extensive list of “possible matches.”  
This means that more fields should be searched to deter-
mine a match—name, date of birth, and identifying num-
ber are probably the best and most common.  The pro-
gram should build in commonly recognized nicknames, 
so that the difference between William and Bill does not 
keep an eligible applicant from becoming a registered 
voter.  Suffixes (i.e. Jr., Sr.) should be disregarded when 
accumulating a possible match list, as they are often in-
consistently entered into databases.  The program should 
allow dates and identifying numbers to be a few digits off, 
to account for possible typos and mistakenly “flipped” 
digits.  Even the best-designed matching program can-
not equal the best practice possible—a manual review of 
possible matches.  Often, an application may be so ridden 
with computer and/or human errors that only a human 
reader can spot and fix the mistakes.  When a fundamen-
tal right such as voting is at stake, a human review should 
be the minimum standard.
Alternate Means of Voter ID 
Verification
The bipartisan sponsors of HAVA recognized that voting 
is such an important right that the law must operate to 
include as many voters in the political process as pos-
sible.  As Senators Bond and Dodd pointed out, register-
ing applicants, even those with imperfect applications, is 
required to comply with the legislative intent of HAVA.  
As the Brennan Center explains, a failed match should 
produce only the single adverse consequence expressly 
provided in HAVA: a citizen registering by mail and 
voting for the first time in a given jurisdiction is subject 
to an identification requirement, unless the state is able 
to match the information in her registration form. The 
match thus serves as one means by which the state may 
identify an applicant; if the match fails, the state must use 
some other means of identifying the applicant.38  States 
have a variety of methods available to them for confirm-
ing an applicant’s identity, most easily by requiring ID 
for first-time voters.  If a state decides to register a non-
matched applicant as a “provisional” voter able to cast 
only a provisional ballot, the state must ensure that it 
educates voters on the mechanics of a provisional ballot 
and clearly explains to each voter that additional identi-
fication will be required for the provisional ballot to be 
counted as a vote.  
More Effective Notifications
Notifications to applicants regarding a failed match 
should be prompt and in plain language.  The notifica-
tions should explain what field did not match the exist-
ing state database and, whenever possible, attach a copy 
of the registration application so that the applicant can 
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see what errors he or she may have made on the form.  A 
detailed explanation of the applicant’s registration status 
and instructions for correcting the problem to achieve 
registration should also be included, along with the ap-
plicable deadlines.  Whenever possible, a mailed notifica-
tion should be followed up with a phone call.  The Social 
Security Administration should update its notification 
process to identify for states which field failed to match so 
that the information can be passed onto the applicant.  
Easy-to-Understand Correction 
Procedures
The process to correct an application should be as easy as 
possible.  Applicants should be able to cure their timely 
filed applications even if the voter registration deadline 
has already passed.   If states follow the previous recom-
mendation that even non-matched applicants be placed 
on the pollbook pending the submission of further docu-
mentation, allowing corrections after the deadline should 
not be problematic—election officials will simply have to 
find the applicant’s record and change their status from 
provisional to fully registered.  Correction of a defect in 
an application should not require the filing of a new form 
if it is sought within a reasonable time period (such as the 
same election cycle, or within one year of the application). 
Applicants should be able to correct defects by bring-
ing their driver’s licenses, state-issued ID cards, or Social 
Security cards to their local election offices.  They should 
also be given the opportunity to cure their application 
by sending the required documentation (i.e. photocopy 
of an aforementioned card) via postal mail or fax.  If an 
application could not be matched because of incomplete 
data, the original application should be returned to the 
individual with the missing section visibly flagged so that 
the applicant may complete and return the form.  
Conclusion
HAVA was designed to establish minimum election ad-
ministration standards and streamline the administration 
of elections across the country, but No Match, No Vote 
laws have only succeeded in creating more confusion and 
inconsistency.  These laws are not merely a minor issue 
in the administration of elections; they strike right at the 
core, disenfranchising qualified voters whose applications 
do not match a demonstrably flawed system of state and 
national databases.  Though only four states have estab-
lished hard-line No Match policies, there are still a num-
ber of ways that states can and do make the voting process 
more difficult through their matching procedures.  By 
adopting the best practices suggested here, states would go 
a long way towards registering voters more accurately and 
ensuring that no eligible citizen is disenfranchised.
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